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Abstract 
Changes in the ecological system, such as climate change, and changes in the social system, 
such as political and economic transformation processes, put water governance regimes under 
pressure. These regimes must either have at their disposal the needed resilience to cope with 
these changes and adapt or face the need to transform into another regime configuration 
which is better suited to cope with these changes. These options entail different levels of 
institutional continuity and change. Three types of balances between institutional continuity 
and change in social-ecological systems are elaborated: persistence, adaptive change and 
transformative change. This paper addresses the challenge of water sector institutions to 
provide for continuity on the one hand while meeting the need to change and adapt to new 
circumstances (such as climate change or political and economic transformation) on the other 
hand. Uzbekistan, which has accumulated intense pressure for change both in the social and 
the ecological system, serves as a case study. Highly unsustainable use of water resources and 
cotton monoculture put high pressure on the ecological system. One of the consequences, the 
desiccation of the Aral Sea, has major negative repercussions in the social system (increasing 
unemployment and decreasing health status of the population). Since the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union political and economic reforms have taken place rather reluctantly and have not 
triggered comprehensive changes in the water governance regime. Minor changes have been 
introduced at the local level, but the system has not yet departed from its unsustainable path 
of development. The paper concludes that the Uzbek water sector is rather resistant to change 
and comprises only a low level of institutional resilience. By applying the concepts of 
adaptive cycles and panarchy to institutions and water governance reform processes in 
Uzbekistan some drivers of these processes are identified.  
2 
1 Introduction 
In many countries the current and future impacts of climate change on water resources require 
a transformation of the water governance systems to increase the resilience and adaptive 
capacity. Transformative change occurs as a result of either ecological crisis (including shifts 
in the ecological system) or shifts within the social system (such as new institutions, social 
values, economic or political change). In Uzbekistan ecological crisis (desiccation of the Aral 
Sea and the beginning impact of climate change) and a shift in the social system (break-down 
of the Soviet Union) can be attested. Central Asia has been exposed to changes in its climate 
regime for several decades. The desiccation of the Aral Sea as a consequence of massive 
water abstraction from its contributories has led to significant regional climate change 
(Nikulina 2006, 84).  
Climate change is likely to diminish the overall amount of water available in the region, 
reduce the stabilising effect of glaciers on water supply and shift the peak flows in rivers to 
times less favourable for irrigated agriculture (Cruz et al. 2007, 477; Savitsky et al. 2008, 
335). At the same time water demand is expected to rise due to population growth. These 
factors render the Uzbek social-ecological system (SES) highly vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change and call for immediate changes in water use and governance.  
Similarly, pressure for change accumulated in the social system due to inappropriate 
management techniques and governance modes. In the Soviet Union the “hierarchical 
structure of society and strong belief in economic growth, technological advances and 
scientific rationality affected attitudes and shaped environmental policies” (Dunbar 2002, 4). 
The premise of the primacy of humans over nature implicated the idea of humans reshaping 
nature (Obertreis 2007, 169). This and a tendency to ignore local conditions and favour a “one 
size fits all” approach (Obertreis 2007, 166-167), contributed to a disconnect of the social and 
the ecological system. The Central Asian water governance system was geared towards 
centralised decision-making with the aim of supplying water to collective farms for cotton 
production (Veldwisch 2008 cited in Abdullaev et al. 2008, 91). The performance of irrigated 
agriculture (and thus also of water management, which was subordinate to the agricultural 
sector) was measured with only one indicator: cotton produced per hectare. Other factors such 
as a sustainable and efficient (water) resource use were not an issue (Abdullaev et al. date 
unknown, 3; Abdullaev 2004, 21).  
The above described setting of a hierarchical and highly centralised system led some to 
describe the Soviet system as highly maladaptive (Holling / Gunderson 2002, 31). After the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union the water governance regime needed to undergo fundamental 
change. Firstly, since water governance structures had to be adapted to the political changes. 
Secondly, because they had proven to be highly unsustainable and led to the desiccation of the 
Aral Sea – one of the world’s largest ecological disasters.  
Thus a window of opportunity and incentives for transformative institutional change were 
given in Uzbekistan. With the continuous reorganization and reform of the social system and 
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the increased impact of climate change, these incentives for change are expected to increase in 
the future.  
However, even though incentives and need for transformation are high, no significant 
transformation of the water sector can be attested despite large deficiencies of its governance 
structures and processes regarding adaptive capacity (e.g. lacks in horizontal and polycentric 
governance, insufficient flexibility of institutions and a lack of stakeholder participation).  
Resilience theory provides a tool for analysing this lack of change (i.e. persistence) in the 
Uzbek social system (Herrfahrdt-Pähle 2010). The possibility to link change (and the lack 
thereof) not only across different levels and time but also across social and ecological systems 
is a major strength of resilience theory and the panarchy concept in particular (Gunderson / 
Holling 2002; cf. below). A number of nested and interacting adaptive cycles at different 
levels of a system are called a panarchy. This concept allows structuring and analysing 
complex processes of social change while acknowledging the relevance of environmental 
change and integrating it in the analysis. Especially the notion of change cascading through a 
panarchy can help to identify links and missing links across levels. By applying the concepts 
of adaptive cycles and panarchy to institutions and water governance reform processes in 
Uzbekistan some drivers of these processes are identified.  
The presented results are based on a literature review and field research undertaken as part of 
the NeWater (New Approaches to Adaptive Water Management under Uncertainty) project. 
During the field research in Uzbekistan (2006 and 2007) empirical data was generated with 
the help of semi-structured interviews and group discussions with experts, decision-makers 
and stakeholders as well as participatory observation.  
2 Change in social-ecological systems: Persistence, adaptation and transformation 
One concept dealing with the resilience of social-ecological systems (SES) and the varying 
amounts of continuity and change of a system over time is that of a number of adaptive cycles 
forming a panarchy (e.g. Holling / Gunderson 2002). In the following this concept is applied 
to institutions as an interface between the social and the ecological system. Institutions are 
defined as “the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (North 1997, 2).  
2.1 The institutional adaptive cycle and institutional panarchy 
The concept of the adaptive cycle can be used as a heuristic model of change and a tool to 
structure and analyse processes of institutional change. It is assumed that similarly to 
ecological systems, social systems and institutions pass through an adaptive cycle consisting 
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of a frontloop (the phases of exploitation and conservation) and a backloop (the phases of 
release and reorganisation; Redman / Kinzig 2003; Aoki 2007; Janssen 2002; cf. Figure 1). 
While the frontloop emphasises growth and stability, the backloop is characterised by change 
and variability. The adaptive cycle operates in a two-dimensional space of connectedness and 
potential. “Connectedness refers to the strength of internal links or relationships that mediate 
external variability” (Bohensky 2008, 9). Potential is the amount of capital that is bound in 
the system and can enable change. In social systems this can be knowledge, innovations, trust, 
networks or governance structures, infrastructure and legal frameworks (Holling / Gunderson 
2002, 49). High potential means that the potential for other use is high but at the same time 
this capital is tightly controlled by the elements (actors) in the system (Holling / Gunderson 
2002, 35).  
 




















Source: Modified from Janssen (2002, 250) 
In the process of implementing new institutional regimes (and the consolidation of these 
logically consistent sets of institutions) a new institutional stability domain is established. The 
new institutions are integrated with the older institutional setting and connectedness increases 



















institutions are reduced and path dependence arises. Over time inconsistencies between 
institutional settings become obvious, leading to the destabilization of the underlying beliefs 
and eventually to a crisis of the institutions (Ω-phase; Aoki 2007, 20). This crisis serves as 
what institutionalists call a shock. It may interrupt the path dependent process, which 
dominated the frontloop of the cycle (i.e. the r- to K-phase) and is the phase of “creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter 1911/1934 cited in Aoki 2007, 22). This is the phase that supports 
the introduction of change and thus favours the increase of the adaptive capacity. A change in 
the social system, i.e. in its institutional setting comes about. The following competition 
between several policy alternatives and old and new institutions (α-phase; Aoki 2007, 20), is a 
critical phase for institutional change. Institutions may either not or only gradually change, 
adjust to the new situation (adaptation) or flip to a completely different institutional setting 
(transformation; Holling / Sanderson 1996, 71; Janssen 2002, 250; cf. below). The 
configuration of new institutions marks the transition to the r-phase, the policy formulation. If 
the system produces new institutions that substantially change system functioning, it enters 
another adaptive cycle. After the new rule or institutional setting is collectively recognized the 
process starts all over again with the implementation of the new setting.  
The application of the adaptive cycle to institutional change suggests that comprehensive new 
policies and institutional settings (i.e. institutional change or even transformation) can mainly 
occur after crisis has occurred, i.e. during the backloop of the cycle (Carpenter / Brock / 
Ludwig 2002, 192; Gunderson et al. 2002, 4; Garmestani / Allen / Gunderson 2009, 2). Crisis 
or surprise may not only originate from within the social system (i.e. internal trigger for 
change such as economic crisis or technological progress). It can also be connected to the 
emergence of crisis in the ecological system (i.e. external trigger for change such as natural 
disasters like droughts or floods). Notwithstanding the good conditions for change during the 
backloop, various obstacles to change exist. Among them are path dependence, a general 
conservatism of organizations, vested interests and the instrumentalisation of uncertainties to 
prevent change (Gunderson 2003, 42).  
In a complex system such as a social system a number of adaptive cycles operate 
simultaneously and are nested into each other. A set of nested adaptive cycles has been called 
a panarchy (Gunderson / Holling 2002). The cycles are connected such that the slower 
moving cycles provide stability (memory) to the lower, faster moving cycles, which innovate 
and may introduce change to the higher, slower levels (revolt; Holling / Gunderson / Peterson 
2002, 75; cf. Figure 2). Referring to the three options following a crisis mentioned above, 
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2.2 Persistence 
A system persists, if – after the disturbance – it returns to its former setup, repeating the 
former adaptive cycle and ignoring possible need for change (backlash into old, inflexible 
institutions – rigidity).  
A system that reorganises after a disturbance without changing its state variables, feedbacks 
and scales (i.e. levels) in operation essentially returns to its original configuration (Gunderson 
et al. 2006, 3). In this situation of persistence marginal adjustments can be attested at best. 
These often affect operational rules such as modes of water distribution and mainly serve the 
preservation of the institutions.  
Such a persistent system is appropriate and well adapted in a stable environment that does not 
expose the social system to much change. With uncertainty and surprise increasing, as can 
currently be observed through climate change, systems must change and become more 
flexible and adaptive (i.e. resilient; Handmer / Dovers 2009, 190). A high degree of continuity 
in a changing environment is related to a low level of resilience since the system is not 
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“that do not adapt become locked in a command-and-control syndrome that can be 
remarkably persistent” (Gunderson / Holling / Light 1995, 497). This state has been termed 
pathological resilience. As a consequence, potential for change accumulates and small 
disturbances such as a prolonged drought may cause major inefficiencies or even collapse (if, 
for example, drought relief schemes have not been developed or updated).  
2.3 Adaptive change 
A social system responding to shifts in ecological or social regimes has been termed adaptive 
(Gunderson et al. 2006, 3). A regime shift is characterised by a change of feedbacks and 
structure of the respective system (Walker et al. 2006, 3), while the state variables or 
functions of the system remain the same (Abel / Cumming / Anderies 2006, 2). The range of 
possible movements that can occur without a change in function is the regime or the domain 
of attraction (Garmestani / Allen / Gunderson 2009, 2). A resilient system disposes of the 
ability to learn from a disturbance and retain the main system functions. When recovering 
from disturbance it adapts and reconfigures in a slightly different system state. This is often 
related to a shift in collective choice rules, such as the competences of Water User 
Associations. Adaptive change thus points to a balance of continuity and change: “there must 
also be some sort of shifting balance between stabilizing and destabilizing forces reflecting 
the degree and intensity of internal controls and the degree of influence of external 
variability” (Holling / Gunderson 2002, 32). Adaptive change is the appropriate solution for a 
system facing a slowly changing environment.  
In terms of the institutional adaptive cycle metaphor adaptive change takes place, if the 
amount of shock following a crisis does not exceed the institutional resilience of the system. 
In the search for alternative institutional settings old and new institutions compete. Finally, a 
new set of institutions is recognized, which seems to fit the demands better (adaptation). This 
reconfiguration or backloop of the cycle comprises the self-organizing ability of the system 
and its effectiveness determines the resilience of the institutional setting (Folke et al. 1998).  
A system may, however, also be confronted with a broad mismatch between its functions and 
its environment either because the (environmental or social) conditions change quickly or 
because adaptation has been neglected. In this case the system needs to transform and switch 
to a different system configuration.  
2.4 Transformative change 
In contrast to adaptive change transformation describes the ability of a social system to create 
a fundamentally new system (Gunderson et al. 2006, 2). It is thus not merely reacting to a 
regime shift in the ecological or social system (e.g. climate change or a political regime shift) 
by increasing the fit of the current social system to the new conditions but it reconfigures its 
own parameters comprehensively. Accordingly, a transformation is characterised by a switch 
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to a new system across a threshold. An example would be a change in constitutional rules 
such as the national water law. The new system differs from the old through different kinds of 
feedbacks, structures and functions (Walker et al. 2006, 3) or state variables (Abel / Cumming 
/ Anderies 2006, 2). Such changes are generally accompanied by paradigm change such as a 
shift from command-and-control to decentralised, participatory water governance. The 
capacity to fundamentally change a system is especially needed when a SES is trapped in a 
highly resistant and undesirable regime and adaptation is no option (Walker et al. 2006, 3).  
Even though transformative change may occur at any phase of the adaptive cycle (since the 
cycle is not necessarily sequential; Abel / Cumming / Anderies 2006, 19) it is assumed that 
such change occurs more easily during or following a crisis (Ω-phase) and that it is difficult to 
initiate transformative change from within the conservation phase (Abel / Cumming / 
Anderies 2006, 20). The reorganisation (α-phase) serves “as a window of opportunity for 
evolving complex adaptive systems” (Abel / Cumming / Anderies 2006, 20). Once a 
transformation is entered at one level of the panarchy, these changes may cascade and change 
the whole panarchy (Walker et al. 2004, 3). However, transformative change of one part of 
the system strongly relies on sources of resilience in other parts of the system that provide 
memory and stability (Carl Folke, personal communication, 09.03.2010). Ideally the new 
system disposes of a higher level of (institutional) resilience.  
Regarding the adaptation of water governance regimes to the challenges of climate change, in 
most cases a transformation of the system is required. This requires a broad change of higher 
levels of institutional panarchy (constitutional rules) and a change of system functions (e.g. 
participation, polycentric, redundant). In this sense the stabilising function of the slower 
levels needs to be overcome. A change of the higher levels (i.e. at national level – change of 
the water law and maybe even the constitution) is required to enable transformative change.  
In terms of the adaptive cycle metaphor transformation occurs, if the amount of shock 
exceeded the institutional resilience of the system. The system arrives at a bifurcation (Folke 
et al. 1998), leaves the current configuration and flips to another regime configuration, i.e. 
into another adaptive cycle. This flip means the discontinuation of much of the former path 
dependent process. The above described three types of change are depicted in Figure 3. 
9 
 





















Source: Own compilation 
2.5 Institutional resilience: The balance of continuity and change in SES 
Even during transformation a certain level of continuity and persistence are necessary to 
prevent the system from chaotic reactions and loss of useful properties. Similarly even during 
consolidation and high levels of persistence institutions need to display a certain degree of 
flexibility and openness to change. Thus the amount of continuity and change varies within a 
certain corridor and in relation to the phase the system is currently undergoing. During the 
backloop (Ω- to α-phase) of the adaptive cycle the amount of change increases, while during 
consolidation phases of the frontloop (r- to K-phase) the amount of continuity is higher than 
the amount of change. Figure 4 depicts adaptive cycles and the three types of change, which 
have been elaborated upon above.  
Accordingly, institutions (or rather institutional arrangements) are resilient if they are stable 
enough in the short term to fulfil their task of reducing uncertainty regarding the possible 
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reactions of actors and thus providing other actors with security for planning. At the same 
time, resilient institutions need to have enough flexibility in the medium to long term to react 
to the uncertainties of a changing environment or changes in the social system. A more 
regular adaptation of institutions will probably entail smaller changes. It is important here to 
find the balance between continuity and change in order not only to be able to adapt to a 
changed situation but also not to change the institutional setting so often that stakeholders lose 
their trust in the functioning and continuity of the institutional setup.  
Applied to water governance, on the one hand, strong and reliable institutions are needed to 
establish and sustain a functioning water governance system. On the other, the increasingly 
uncertain environment forces social systems and institutions to become more adaptive – that 
is more flexible and open to change – in order to be able to admit innovation and adapt to new 
circumstances. The task thus is to find the appropriate balance between innovation and 
conservation in any given situation of the water governance regime. „Systems where change is 
not allowed will almost certainly generate surprise and crisis. Systems that allow too much 
change and novelty will suffer loss of memory” (Berkes / Colding / Folke 2003, 376). This 
(evolving or dynamic) equilibrium of continuity and change would then constitute a preferred 
level of institutional resilience. Such an equilibrium can be achieved through a mix of 
institutions that have a stabilising role and those that preserve flexibility (Ebbesson in press). 
This mix of flexible and stable institutions can occur at one level or be spread across levels 
with institutions at one level being more rigid and those at another level more flexible.  
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3 Case study Uzbekistan: Marginal water governance reforms and decreasing 
institutional resilience 
Located in the heart of Central Asia, the Republic of Uzbekistan once belonged to the Soviet 
Union. The country is characterised by a semiarid climate and most of the available water is 
generated in neighbouring countries. The Uzbek economy is dominated by large-scale 
irrigated agriculture, mainly of cotton but also wheat, which was introduced during Soviet 
times. The state budget depends heavily on revenues and foreign currency generated through 
cotton exports. Inefficient water infrastructure and institutions have led to the desiccation of 
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3.1 The institutional panarchy 
With the end of the Soviet Union the political system of the Uzbek SSR and its institutions 
faced a major crisis. In the following reorganisation phase the Soviet constitution was 
replaced with a democratic constitution. Thus on paper the political system changed from 
centralised, command-and-control, single-party rule towards a democratic, multi-party 
system. However, significant deficits have to be attested regarding the implementation of 
democratic principles such as civil rights, rule of law and the separation of powers (Schoeller-
Schletter 2008, 19). The state administration remains rigid and inflexible, with strong 
centralistic structures and an authoritarian management style (Yalcin 2005; Pashkun 2003, 
14). The centralisation of power renders public administration slow (because even minor 
issues are decided by central government), devoid of democratic checks and balances and 
providing little incentives for reforms (Pashkun 2003, 21). At the political level the system 
was highly resilient – reorganising in a similar configuration (despite having implemented a 
democratic constitution) after the shock of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Thus, despite a 
change in formal institutions, structures and modes of governance have barely changed. 
Powerful feedback loops such as the incentives created for elites in form of rents from cotton 
monoculture (and the resulting lack of political will for change), the general attitude of the 
population towards change and the lack of experience with democratic structures as well as 
the lack of innovation keep the system on its unsustainable path. The rigidities observed at the 
national level translate to the lower levels of administration.  
Uzbekistan is also perceived as a relatively poor performer concerning its transition to a 
market based system (Bertelsmann Foundation 2004). The President rejects any radical 
reforms and regularly underlines his course of gradual change towards a socially oriented 
market economy (Pashkun 2003, 14). In the agricultural sector, which is by far the main water 
user and thus closely related to the water sector, mechanisms such as the state order remained 
in place. The land reforms which were undertaken did not question these structures and 
mechanisms. Even in 2003, when several reform initiatives in the water and the agricultural 
sectors coincided, these have not been used to adapt or even transform the system in order to 
increase its resilience.  
Since water is the main input for the agricultural sector, which is the backbone of the Uzbek 
economy, the need to establish a national water law was apparent after independence. The 
new law on water was mainly derived from Soviet water law and did not provide incentives 
for change. Instead (superficial) change in the water sector was motivated by external drivers 
(e.g. land reform) or internal power plays (e.g. between the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Water Management).  
From Figure 5 it becomes evident that the Uzbek SES is not only largely preserving structures 
and feedbacks but also that the levels of the institutional panarchy are disconnected. Change 
remains incremental and isolated at lower levels of the panarchy. Since changes are marginal 
and disconnected they do not serve as triggers for change at other levels of the panarchy, i.e. 
change does not cascade. Instead the triggers for (marginal) change are often not only diverse 
13 
and external to the adaptive cycle in question but also to the institutional panarchy as a whole. 
The result is a patchwork of unconnected and isolated institutional change initiated to serve 
the purposes of the administration and ruling elite instead of providing solutions for the 
challenges of the social and the ecological system (e.g. poverty and environmental 
degradation). This means that the Uzbek social system despite being classified as transition 
country has not yet entered transformative change.  
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3.2 Institutional resilience of the Uzbek social-ecological system: A rigidity trap 
Uzbekistan is an example of pathological resource management (Gunderson / Pritchard 2002, 
3-4). Soviet water managers were successful in achieving the narrowly defined goal of 
providing enough water for cotton monoculture in the Central Asian republics. This success 
encouraged the rapid enlargement of irrigated agriculture in the region and the overuse of 
water resources. As a result of this one-sided approach to resource management, Uzbekistan 
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today is highly dependent on agricultural production, especially of cotton, and the 
unsustainable use of its water resources.  
After independence, the Uzbek agricultural sector has served as a “shock absorber” (Weinthal 
2002, 196) of the SES. It absorbed a large amount of labour and provided foreign exchange in 
the absence of transfers from Moscow. The persistence of cotton monoculture and the de-
coupling of the social and the ecological system helped to stabilise the social system and thus 
prevented its collapse. This de-coupling of the social from the ecological system originating 
in Soviet times can be observed in many parts of society. The most prominent and devastating 
example is the desiccation of the Aral Sea. Despite causing not only severe ecological but also 
economic and social damages this problem has been neglected over decades. It has only 
begun to be addressed in the late 1980s and has not led to significant changes in production 
patterns (Glazovsky 1995). The stabilisation of the social system happened to the further 
detriment of the ecological system thus decreasing the resilience of the SES as a whole 
(Schlüter / Herrfahrdt-Pähle submitted).  
The possible impacts of climate change have emerged on the political agenda recently and do 
not range high in priority. Decision makers have only recently begun to realise the connection 
between climate change and water resources. In 2009 the government took a first step and 
initiated a call for a climate change adaptation strategy for the water sector (Sadoff / Muller 
2009, 67).  
The low capacity of the current water management regime to deal with the old and emerging 
challenges can be explained to some extent by a mismatch of the functioning of the resource 
and management regimes, as well as mismatches between different levels of the social 
system. The Uzbek social system and its water sector in particular focus their attention and 
operation on internal processes and power plays as well as the mediation of climate 
variability. Reactions to crises such as drought are short-term oriented rather than focussing 
on the long-term functioning of the system. Huntjens et al. quote a decision maker from the 
middle water hierarchy: “We are only preparing for one or two years ahead, there are no 
preparations for the far future” (Huntjens et al. 2008, 82). Uzbek water governance is thus 
merely solving current and acute problems, while disregarding longer-term problems such as 
the impact of climate change on water resources. For example water is rationed and reused 
during drought years, and rice planting is prohibited. Both measures are appropriate from a 
short-term perspective. However, much more far-reaching adaptation measures (e.g. the 
reduction of water use of the agricultural sector) and even transformation in the form of a 
general shift in production patterns are required with a view to the degree of the ecological 
crisis. Furthermore, there are many ways to circumvent these regulations through patronage 
networks.  
Many of the new institutions are ineffective in changing water management practices because 
they do not take institutional or political boundary conditions into account (Walker et al. 
2009). The changes that are initiated take place on the wrong scale and at the wrong level: For 
example change of institutions at the local level (introduction of WUA) is not mirrored and 
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supported by introducing the matching institutions at the national level (WUA law) or 
changing surrounding institutions and boundary conditions (e.g. the responsibility of local 
governors for agricultural production, which leads to their interference in local water 
distribution). This mode of incremental change has been termed “patching up” (Genschel 
1997, 46). It refers to the strategy of not replacing an institution with a new one but rather 
compensating for its inefficiencies with a new institution (i.e. “adding new rooms to the old 
house”). Thus the inappropriate water law is patched up with a number of decrees that 
introduce WUA and hydrological boundaries instead of drafting a new water law. The 
institutional regime thus represents high long-term continuity (Soviet water law prevailing), 
while change is introduced rather on the short term through presidential decrees (WUA, basin 
management; Yalcin 2005, 28). Thus the institutional changes in the water sector at best 
increase the short-term resilience of the social system to the detriment of long-term resilience 
of the SES.  
In Uzbekistan pressure for rapid change is building up because the social system is firstly 
unable to react to feedback on crisis from the ecological system (such as the desiccation of the 
Aral Sea, change in hydrographs and precipitation) and secondly ignores and suppresses 
pressure for change from within the social system (e.g. political opponents are prosecuted and 
jailed; ICG 2007, 7; Collins 2002, 150). The Uzbek social system possesses a low adaptive 
capacity and has proven unable to adapt to changes in the ecological system. It seems unlikely 
that it is going to establish the missing link and react appropriately to the challenges of 
climate change and decreasing water availability in the future. Instead it is likely to continue 
to cling to the current mode of economic activity and employ ever more desperate measures 
to keep it in place, indicating a rigidity trap, similar to the one described for the Western 
Australian agricultural region (Allison / Hobbs 2004).  
A system locked in a rigidity trap strongly resists disturbances, beyond the point where this 
is adaptive. “Rigidity traps occur in social–ecological systems when institutions become 
highly connected, self-reinforcing, and inflexible” (Gunderson and Holling 2002, cited in 
Carpenter / Brock 2008, 2) and “where management by command and control severely 
reduces diversity, and forces of power and profit are mutually reinforcing” (Carpenter / Brock 
2008, 2-3). This is often the case when social systems highly depend upon a single resource 
and try to stabilise the provision of this resource by reducing variation in resource dynamics 
(Carpenter / Brock 2008, 2).  
In the Uzbek case decreasing cotton yields are the result of the degradation of soils and water 
scarcity but also a lack of incentives to increase the productivity within the state order system 
(Abdullaev / Giordano / Rasulov 2007, 104). The current institutional setting does not allow 
for other more productive uses of soil and water (e.g. other crops) or even options other than 
agriculture (e.g. tourism or solar energy). Instead even more effort is put into conserving a 
highly unsustainable system. For example, students and even school children are forced to 
pick cotton in an attempt to compensate for low yields and broken machinery (Cannell 2007). 
In 2009 school children were reportedly forced to grow cotton seedlings at home to support 
farmers because unusually heavy rains had washed away the seeds (Najibullah 2009). After 
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had pressed the Uzbek government to align its cotton 
prices to world market prices this resulted in modest changes in cotton prices. In some 
provinces the foregone “revenue” was compensated for by tripling property taxes (Peyrouse 
2009, 9). These examples show the desperate measures that are taken to keep the system 
going despite other dynamics.  
A system in a rigidity trap represents properties such as a high connectedness, a high potential 
and high resistance to change. A high potential results from highly efficient social control, 
suppressing innovation (Holling / Gunderson / Peterson 2002, 95-96). The high potential or 
(social and cultural) capital of the Uzbek social system for enabling change is for example 
reflected in its extended social networks, but also in high levels of literacy and scientific 
knowledge and its complex governance structures dating from Soviet times (Pashkun 2003, 
45). However, this potential is restricted because governance structures do no longer fit the 
changed circumstances since independence and sources of innovation are eliminated thus 
supporting the current lock-in situation.  
The already high connectedness of the Uzbek social system is increasing, leading to what has 
been termed overconnectedness (Holling / Gunderson 2002, 35). The agricultural and the 
water sector are strongly connected, with a clear dominance of the agricultural sector. This 
overconnectedness makes it almost impossible to introduce change at one point of the system 
without changing the whole system. A lack of secure land rights leads to little incentives to 
invest in irrigation infrastructure, which is deteriorating, thus negatively influencing water use 
efficiency. In the future, increasing climate variability is more likely to put harvests at risk. 
Farmers unable to meet state order targets risk loosing their land. To be able to fulfil the 
(often unrealistic) targets cotton is often excessively irrigated to increase cotton weight for the 
harvest (Wall 2006). This practice in turn adds to inefficiency and overuse of water. Thus the 
primacy of the state order drives developments in the water sector (Yalcin 2005, 30). The 
rising connectedness implies increasing rigidity and a low sensitivity towards change and 
crisis in the ecological system. Also the political and the economic spheres are highly 
intertwined since the cotton revenue partly enters the national budget while the larger part is 
reportedly channelled to political elites (Carmel 2005, 605; ICG 2007, 4; ICG 2005, 4-5).  
The social system is highly resistant to change. The current system resists carrying out the 
necessary structural changes in land and water use at the national level and thus adapting to 
the current ecological and larger political situation. Change is rather motivated by 
perpetuating the current mode of production and sustaining the rents it creates. At the same 
time and as a consequence of these properties the resilience of the SES continuously 
decreases due to the continuing overuse of resources, leading to an increased vulnerability to 
shocks and disturbance. Given these dimensions of adaptive change the system has become 
brittle and a minor disturbance (such as an extended drought and/or local water conflicts) 
could push the system over a threshold and make it reorganise.  
Given the current unsustainable state of the system, its rigid institutional setup and the 
mismatch between the social and the ecological systems, adaptation will not be sufficient to 
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ensure its continued functioning. A transformation of the SES is needed. Such a 
transformation would have to question and change current patterns of economic activity and 
resource use and lead to less water-intensive modes of production. This could for example 
include abandoning low productivity soils, switching to other less water-intensive crops, 
developing tourism and/or exploring the possibility of solar energy production. Given today's 
strong dependence on agricultural production and the societal conditions described above, one 
might speculate that once the economic losses from mismanagement and overuse of natural 
resources are great enough to threaten state budgets and existing rents, the political 
willingness to engage in comprehensive reforms might rise. With a view to the still relatively 
low levels of discontent among the population, rooted in the fatalism which is part of the 
Uzbek culture, however, it is questionable how long it will take until this point is reached and 
whether the system by that time will still have enough capacity and time to reorganize and 
prevent a collapse. In addition, the system will continue to be subject to external pressures 
such as climate change, world economic crisis and policy changes in other riparian countries 
which have the potential to push the system nearer to (or even over) a threshold into an even 
less desirable configuration.  
4 Conclusion 
In Uzbekistan high pressure for change has accumulated over the decades as it was locked in 
a highly resilient and maladaptive regime. The Uzbek social system disregarded 
environmental change during Soviet times and has been overusing its water resources for 
decades. Comprehensive change of the whole system (including slowly moving variables at 
the national level) is required, since incremental change or adaptation would not be sufficient 
to tackle the mounting problems. A window of opportunity opened and the country set out to 
transform its political and economic structures in after independence in 1991.  
However, Uzbekistan’s reform efforts remained superficial so far – in the political and 
economic sphere and in the water sector. Water governance remains state-centred, 
hierarchical, subordinate to agricultural production and driven by vested interests. As a 
consequence of historic developments in the agricultural sector and the strong feedbacks they 
created, the social-ecological system is locked into a state that is to a large extent still 
determined by the legacies of the Soviet Union. The massive expansion of irrigated 
agriculture, the following heavy dependence on the agricultural sector and the neglect of the 
development of other sectors such as industry during Soviet times largely contributed to this 
lock-in effect. Vested interests created and perpetuated after independence now strongly 
influence, if not political decisions, than at least their implementation on the ground. The 
institutional change observed in Uzbekistan so far has been aimed at ensuring a stable 
production level of cotton and expanding wheat production to achieve food self-sufficiency. 
Small adjustments have been carried out in cases where underlying power structures and 
vested interests were either not touched or could be supported through the changes. This 
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underlines the importance of informal institutions and their power to overrule formal 
institutions in the water sector and beyond.  
The Uzbek water governance regime has not been able to use the window of opportunity that 
opened with its independence from the Soviet Union. Instead its institutional resilience and 
adaptive capacity continue to decrease through rigid institutions, lack of participation and 
transparency and a strongly hierarchical and centralised water governance regime. The strong 
feedback loops created by the patronage networks and vested interests and their skimming of 
cotton revenues continue to prevent learning and the innovation needed at the national level to 
transform the system towards a more sustainable resource use. Thus state officials such as 
local and regional governors (khokim) have vested interests in the status quo that provides 
them with access to economic resources in the form of cotton rents and power. These 
mechanisms (powerful economic forces and vested interests) have contributed to keeping the 
social system on an unsustainable trajectory and limiting its choices. This increases the 
vulnerability of the system to external and internal shocks. Thus, with time the system is 
moving on an unfavourable trajectory towards a position where it is becoming more and more 
vulnerable to losing major desirable functions and characteristics. Institutional change that is 
taking place at a local level, e.g. through the slowly growing acceptance of Water User 
Associations (WUA), is constrained by the rigidity of boundary conditions (e.g. state order, 
patronage networks, dominance of the agricultural sector). Given the centralized decision-
making that still prevails today, resilience and transformability at the national level are needed 
to enable the lower levels to adapt and change.  
The findings underline the role of an enabling environment for comprehensive water 
governance reforms. The Uzbek case study illustrates important drivers of institutional change 
or the lack thereof such as informal institutions (e.g. patronage networks, vested interests), 
path dependence and the lacking demand for change by the constituencies. Without 
supportive structures at all levels of the institutional panarchy water governance reform 
efforts seem to be difficult to accomplish. This indicates the need to supplement and balance 
bottom-up developments with top-down movements. Thus water governance reforms should 
be facilitated by a comprehensive institutional reform effort at the national level, which is 
complemented with a reasonable amount of public participation. Only a consistent approach 
to adaptation at all levels and scales will help to cope with the challenges climate change 
increasingly entails for the sustainable use of water resources. 
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